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Research Performance and the Organizational Effectiveness of UK Universities 
 
Purpose of this paper (limit 100 
words) 
We test Shattock’s legacy reputation thesis that non-
leading universities in the UK face insuperable resource 
barriers to entering the leading group.   
Design/methodology/approach 
(limit 100 words) 
Employing regression analysis, we examine whether 
prioritizing research performance is a viable strategy for 
non-leading UK universities aiming to improve their 
organizational effectiveness. The dependent variable, 
organizational effectiveness, is measured by the annual 
Guardian rankings of universities. The main independent 
variable, research performance, is measured using 
“research power” (‘RP’). RP is derived from the UK 
Research Excellence Framework (REF).  
 
Findings (limit 100 words) For 2008-14 we find that changes in research performance 
impacted university rankings. However, we also find that 
changes to the rankings are largely confined to non-leading 
universities and have not led to these institutions breaking 
into the group of leading universities. Therefore, 
Shattock’s thesis is supported.  
 
Research implications (limit 100 
words) 
Future research should use a longer time-span. It should 
investigate in more detail the mechanisms involved in the 
research performance-organizational effectiveness 
relationship.   
Implications for Practice (100 
words) 
Failing to maintain research performance can have 
significant negative consequences for the rankings of 
non-leading universities.   
Originality/value This is the first study that examines the relationship 
between the research performance of universities in the 
UK with a measure of their overall organizational 
effectiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We test Shattock’s (2003, 2010) legacy reputation thesis that non-leading universities face 
insuperable resource barriers to entering the leading group.  More specifically, we examine 
the role research performance as measured by what is currently known as the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) plays in improving the organizational effectiveness of non-
leading universities in the UK.  Engaging in the REF is a time-consuming and expensive 
exercise.  The question is whether it is a viable means for non-leading universities to improve 
their organizational effectiveness or whether their managers should use other means.  
There is no commonly agreed basis for judging the organizational effectiveness of 
nonprofit organizations (NPOs) such as universities (Herman and Renz, 2008).  Whereas a 
significant proportion of studies of organizational effectiveness of businesses have used 
exclusively financial criteria, studies of NPOs are more likely to use a range of nonfinancial 
criteria such as employee satisfaction, quality, and public image (Baruch and Ramalho, 
2006).  How best to define organizational effectiveness in the nonprofit sector has been 
subject to considerable debate (Mitchell, 2013).  Part of the challenge is that while over and 
above the fact that NPOs cannot distribute earnings to anyone and that they receive part of 
their income from public sources, NPOs are disparate in terms of their activities (Herman and 
Renz, 2008).  Although NPO organizational effectiveness remains a problematic construct, 
Herman and Renz (2008) suggest a number of “theses” or notions that should guide research. 
One is that measures should always be multidimensional; NPO effectiveness cannot be 
assessed with a single indicator.  Another is that studies of organizational effectiveness 
should be comparative; organizations should be compared with similar organizations.  
Further, while they support and encourage the use of hard evidence to the extent it is 
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legitimately possible, a measure of NPO effectiveness is not significant “until someone forms 
judgments of effectiveness from them (and, usually, communicates those judgments) and acts 
on the judgments” (Herman and Renz, 2008: 404).  
We operationalize the organizational effectiveness of universities by using the annual 
Guardian University League Table.  As we clarify below, it is multidimensional and uses 
“hard evidence”.  It enables universities to compare themselves with one another, and it is 
widely recognized by users of higher education.  Substantial evidence exists that in countries 
where universities and other higher education institutions are ranked, they take a significant 
interest in how they perform (Morgeson and Nahrgang, 2008).  Rankings are an important 
constituent of reputation and therefore have an impact on decision-making by potential 
students and their families, and by graduate employers (Argenti, 2000).  Because they signal 
which universities are “leading”, rankings are important to consumers of higher education, 
especially prospective students and their families, who have in recent years had to bear 
increased costs and risks.  They are also significant to the universities themselves as ways of 
publicly communicating their brands and reputations to other stakeholders.  Internally, 
rankings can elicit powerful reactive responses within universities, stimulating extensive and 
intensive internal measures to improve their positions (Espeland and Sauder, 2007).  Given 
the importance of rankings to universities, how far they can enhance them is clearly an 
important issue for all stakeholders and especially for managers.  
Our article is structured as follows.  We initially discuss what it means to be a leading 
university in terms of historical advantage.  Thereafter, we provide an overview of the key 
broad university rankings, focusing on the components of the Guardian rankings.  Next, we 
discuss the research performance assessment, the REF, showing how it has evolved, how it 
works and its results.  We then address Shattock’s thesis about how the positions or rankings 
of leading institutions’ appear impregnable.  Next, we introduce our research questions.  The 
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aims of our empirical analysis are to assess the stability of these two measures over the period 
2008-2014 and to determine whether changes in research performance are associated with 
changes in the Guardian rankings.  Finally, we discuss our findings, before drawing 
conclusions and identifying practical implications for policy makers and managers. 
 
LEADING AND NON-LEADING UNIVERSITIES  
UK Universities have expanded throughout the 20th and 21st Centuries.  By September 2015, 
there were 131 in the UK (all figures: HEFCE, 2015).  One sizeable group of universities was 
created post 1992: official lists as of September 2015 show that these numbered 55; a smaller 
group of 26 had previously been created between 1945 and 1991.  Writing recently in the 
Financial Times (2017), Mathew Engel observed that “(UK) universities are no longer judged 
by vague perceptions, they are ranked … what was once a vague pecking order (has been 
transformed) into a set of almost Hindu gradations marking the layers between the Brahmins 
and untouchables.”  
There are many categorizations of UK universities (see for example Hewitt-Dundas, 
2012 and Hicks, 2012).  They vary in the terms they use, but they seek to capture widely 
acknowledged organizational differences and statuses.  One such is the distinction between 
“Russell Group” universities and others.  Twenty-four research-intensive institutions have 
banded together to form the influential Russell Group to advance their interests, lobby 
government and project their collective identity (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012).  Another, similar 
distinction is that advanced by Hicks (2012) that the UK contains two generic types of 
university, the ‘elite’ and the ‘non-elite’.  We prefer the terms ‘leading’ and ‘non-leading’ as 
a categorization for our purpose.  Yet whatever labels are used, real differences in their nature 
and status exist.  The former raise relatively high proportions of their income from research; 
the latter derive the bulk of their income from teaching large numbers of students (Hicks, 
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2012).  In 2004-2005, 65 per cent of all research grant and contract income in UK 
Universities was accounted for by the Russell Group Universities (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012).  
Fulton (2003: 165) argued that the division between different types of institution would 
persist and potentially even harden as leading universities build on existing advantages.  
Thus, research is for them a largely indirect way of achieving a better reputation, attracting 
more good-quality applicants and improving their financial positions.   
Shattock (2003) argued that the historic turning point in inter-university 
differentiation occurred in the mid-1980s with the first REF (then known as the “Research 
Assessment Exercise”).  By 2001 it was clear “that research excellence is stable amongst the 
top ranked institutions … high quality research, once established, tends to reinforce itself” 
(Shattock, 2003:6-7).  From 1994, national newspapers began to publish annual league tables 
that effectively sought to measure the organizational effectiveness of universities in terms of 
a range of outcomes of “concern to the wider public (as well as students)” (Shattock, 2003:7) 
such as teaching quality.  For the period to 2001, Shattock (2003:15) observes a powerful 
correlation or “coherence” between research performance and organizational effectiveness as 
measured by the university league tables.  Although universities can compete for both staff 
and students, Shattock argues that legacy reputation means that leading universities have a 
powerful, sustainable competitive advantage over non-leading universities in terms of 
attracting the best faculty and the best students.  Similarly, Naidoo et.al (2011) argue that 
highly ranked UK universities draw on non-replicable, durable historic advantages and 
cachet.  The large body of new universities created after 1992, (commonly known as ‘post-
92s’) meant that a large number of universities did not enjoy these advantages and have been 
labeled non-leading (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012). 
Further, drawing on a variety of studies of sustained organizational success (e.g. 
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1993; Kay, 1993; Collins and Porras, 1994), Shattock (2003) argues 
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that these institutions’ reputations are underpinned by complementary resources and 
capabilities developed over time, that are hard to replicate and confer sustainable advantage.  
These include established bundles of practice, organizational architectures and cultures.  
Shattock’s (2003) argument is consistent with the concept of organizational complementarity 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Amable, 2015).  As Espeland and Sauder (2007) demonstrate 
for US law schools, we view the rankings and the REF as complementary since they interact 
and reinforce each other, as elements within a coherent wider social system.  In line with 
Hewitt-Dundas (2012: 266), we also view them as encompassing the whole range of a 
university’s physical, material and intangible reputational assets and are collectively 
substantial.  Some, such as university longevity, are non-replicable.  Others, such as their 
ability to pay relatively high academic salaries, may be replicable.  
Shattock’s argument has been buttressed by two factors that emerged since he first 
wrote.  First, the costs to universities of improving research performance have been rising as 
Geuna and Piolatto (2016) report.  However, many costs are hard to capture.  For example, 
full professors’ pay has increased through inter-university competition.  UK full-professors’ 
salaries (unlike those of other grades) are negotiable, un-capped and have recently been 
subject to considerable increases as universities have competed for talent (De Fraja et al, 
2013).  Given the key importance to academics of working in universities employing the best 
talent in their areas, they are highly motivated to move to them if possible (De Fraja et al, 
2013).  Thus, financial resources attract further (human) resources (Hicks, 2012).  Second, 
Hunt (2016) has shown through a case study of an attempt to develop a greater research 
emphasis in a post-92 university that the demands made on both faculty and managers in 
attempting this are multifarious and complex.  They involve intensifying research effort while 
concurrently dealing with the heavy teaching loads that generate major income streams for 
these universities.  
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The significance for non-leading universities of lacking legacy reputation depends on 
whether the institutional context offers opportunities to challenge established reputations of 
superior organizational effectiveness in the public arena.  Given the apparent powerful 
correlation between research performance and the annual university league tables, one 
possible avenue might be to invest in improved research performance.  Another might be to 
distrust this indirect avenue and simply aim directly to improve the organizational 
effectiveness outcomes captured by the league tables or rankings such as teaching quality.  
Let us first examine the annual rankings and thereafter research performance.  
 
NATIONAL RANKINGS AND THE SHATTOCK THESIS 
Three national rankings of UK universities are published annually – The Complete University 
Guide, the Guardian (GRG) and joint Times and Sunday Times tables.  They have established 
themselves as guides to prospective consumers.  The three rankings employ various input and 
outcome measures (Appendix 1).  We have selected the GRG because - unlike the others - it 
has no research component, allowing a ‘cleaner’ analysis of the impact of changes to research 
performance.  However, the correlation coefficients for the other two rankings (Complete 
University Guide and the joint Times and Sunday Times ranking) with GRG are 91 percent 
and 90 percent respectively.  Investigating the subsample for the two upper quintiles of 
universities, the correlations are 92 percent in both cases and for the rest, 88 percent and 87 
percent respectively.  Thus, little distinguished the three rankings in outcome terms.  
As Table 1 shows, GRG uses eight different criteria, each weighted between 5 and 15 
percent.  Overall, the measure is divided between inputs and outputs.  In output terms, it 
captures student perceptions of feedback, job prospects, overall quality, teaching quality and 
‘value added’ (outputs overall = 55 percent).  In input measure terms, it includes entry scores, 
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spending per student and faculty-student ratios (inputs overall = 45 percent).  It contains a 
specific “value-added” factor comparing students’ degree results with their entry 
qualifications (Heily-Rayner, 2016).   
- Table 1 here– 
Although the main body of our empirical analysis is not dichotomous, in parts of it we 
define the ‘leading’ group as approximating to the top quintile of the GRG, most of which are 
‘Russell Group’ institutions (see below).1  We now turn to the specifics of how the UK 
government assesses research performance through the REF.   
 
RESEARCH PERFORMANCE 
For nearly three decades, British universities have had their research performance evaluated 
and ranked by the British state at roughly five to six year intervals.  For the sake of 
simplicity, we refer to these as the “REF”.  The REF of 2014 is the most recent iteration.  A 
government-funded body (The Higher Education Funding Council for England: HEFCE) 
manages the REF on behalf of counterpart bodies in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
The results of the HEFCE assessments are publicly disseminated and are used to determine 
the share of substantial government research funding allocated to each university.  The 
purposes of these exercises are multiple and have been discussed by several researchers (see 
for example Marginson, 2014; Naidoo et al., 2011).  However, a central governmental 
intention has been to raise the overall level of UK research by intensifying competition for 
state funds (Marginson, 2014).  In addition to allocating research-specific, non-project 
funding support, the REF has sought to benchmark UK research against international 
                                                          
1 Inevitably, this boundary is somewhat arbitrary.  A much narrower view of “leading” would 
be those sometime called the “G5”: the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, Imperial 
College London, University College London and the London School of Economics.  
However, that group is equally arbitrary in that it excludes the 19 other members of the 
Russell Group universities as well as others widely regarded as prestigious.  
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standards, while presenting UK research to the world since its detailed assessments are 
publicly available.   
The REF has influenced the academic labor market by encouraging and facilitating 
universities efforts to seek out and recruit high-performing researchers (Hicks, 2012).  It has 
pushed institutions and researchers to improve economic and social impacts to raise the wider 
policy, industrial and social relevance of research (Marginson, 2014).  However, the REF has 
also generated considerable controversy.  Hicks (2012) argues that, for institutions, the REF 
has become primarily a competition for prestige rather than just one for funding.  Further, 
Martin and Whitley (2010) even claim that those who conduct the assessments are recruited 
from leading institutions and may be biased in favor of them.  In this way, they argue, the 
gradings of their own institutions are higher than they otherwise would be, and stratification 
between departments and institutions is increased.  
The REF has changed considerably over time, becoming increasingly complex and 
demanding for universities since its introduction in 1986 (Martin, 2011).  Part of the 
increasing burden has arisen because the measures used have constantly shifted (Martin, 
2011).  The costs to institutions of gearing themselves up to perform well affect all university 
employees and arguably all students.  The REF has been argued to militate towards an 
increasing division of labor between REF researchers and teachers, as faculty are hired on or 
moved on to teaching-only contracts if they are judged to be unsuccessful researchers 
(Rowlinson et al., 2015).  Internal changes to the division of labor between academics - for 
example, teaching loads increasing for those not regarded as sufficiently ‘research active’ 
while decreasing for others who are provided with time to improve their outputs and career 
prospects - may affect internal cohesion.  From a faculty perspective, these changes could 
negatively impact individuals’ motivation.  They could therefore be dysfunctional for the 
institutions and the academics concerned (Martin and Whitley, 2010: 72).    
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The REF has evoked considerable reactions within Universities that vary in their 
nature and intensity (Hewitt-Dundas, 2012; De Fraja et al., 2016).  Institutional strategies 
may, at one end of the spectrum of theoretical possibilities, strongly prioritize REF research 
performance through faculty incentives, monitoring and recruitment or, at the other, simply 
collect and transmit whatever its academics produce without seeking to influence that to any 
degree.  More strongly REF-oriented strategies appear more likely to be adopted if 
institutions perceive them to lead to better university rankings. 
We now present the broad outlines of the 2008 and 2014 REFs, as despite their 
elaboration and increasing complexity their core design was similar.  Universities seeking 
state ‘Quality-Related’ (‘QR’) funding for their general research efforts were required to 
make entries to the REF though it was and is not compulsory to request QR funds.  Crucially, 
universities may choose which subject areas (‘Units of Assessment’: UoAs) and which 
members of faculty to submit; there has been no obligation on them to submit all faculty.  
Universities prepare detailed statements of their research environment (notably their doctoral 
student completions, the research funding from all sources they have spent and how they 
nurture research), and list the details of the faculty they are submitting together with a list of 
selected published outputs.  Up to four items may be submitted for each individual faculty 
member, depending on the proportion of full-time that they work and whether they are 
defined as ‘early career’ or have personal reasons such as pregnancy or illness for being 
submitted with less than four items. 
From 2008, government research assessment acquired a new and crucial significance 
as a funding mechanism since the availability of separate sizeable project-based research 
funding from the research councils was significantly reduced in and around 2008.  From 
2008, measurement of university research performance was also conducted differently than 
hitherto; previous exercises were not comparable since earlier criteria had under specified 
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circumstances allowed academics’ outputs to be counted by more than one institution.  
Simultaneously, for the overwhelming majority of universities that chose to participate, 
involvement in delivering inputs to the research assessment process became even more costly 
from 2008.  As criticisms were made of assessment methodologies, so requirements became 
more demanding.  The “REF” was experienced as so resource-demanding that one authority 
described it as a ‘Frankenstein monster’ (Martin, 2011: 247).  Clearly, if changes in research 
performance do not have consequences for the GRG rankings one could after 2008 question 
even more than previously the management effort and resources involved in investing in 
developing and implementing a REF-focused research performance strategy. 
In 2014, a requirement introduced in 2008 was extended, specifying that each UoA 
submission should contain a general statement about efforts to promote the societal and 
policy impacts of their research and should present a number of ‘Impact Case Studies’, whose 
number would vary in proportion to the total number of faculty submitted.  These were 
designed to illustrate actual impacts on policy and practice and represented a considerable 
additional burden.  Consultants confirm that the requirement to produce these studies (7,000 
were produced across institutions) meant that the effort required to submit to the REF grew 
considerably in comparison with previous exercises, costing institutions an extra 150 million 
pounds in addition to intangible costs (Manville et al., 2014: 10-11).  They simultaneously 
estimated these costs to be high in international terms.  The effort could not, as with 
publications, be reduced by buying impacts generated at other universities simply by hiring 
their faculty.  Potential case studies had to be identified.  ‘Runners’ had to be selected, 
weaker studies selected out and studies fully documented and supported by named external 
sources to vouch for the impacts claimed.  Impact could (and by implication ought to) be 
located in research produced up to fifteen years previously, meaning that senior faculty 
involved at the beginning of that period had frequently left the University (possibly on bad 
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terms) or retired.  The case studies were developed in a context of uncertainty about the 
precise requirements of what they should consist of and what would be recognized as 
‘impact’.  Thus, the costs to institutions of submitting to the REF have grown considerably 
since 2008.  
Espeland and Sauder (2007) point out that public measures tend to generate 
widespread ‘gaming’ and this is indeed the case here.  Marginson (2014) highlights how 
institutions used various tactics to attempt to inflate their universities’ research assessments, 
drawing particular attention to the tactic of submitting a small number of high-performing 
academics in order to push up the collective quality score for their outputs while excluding 
their lower-rated colleagues.  Marginson argued overall that leading universities were better 
able to ‘game’ the system in this and other ways than other institutions.  It was partly for this 
reason that educational journalists devised “research power” (‘RP’) ratings that take into 
account the number of academics involved in achieving quality scores.  ‘Research Power’ is 
not a term or measure used or determined by REF assessors directly but is, rather, an 
appropriation of particular REF measures into a composite index devised and used by media 
analysts when they communicate research performance.  It is also increasingly used by the 
academic community (Marginson, 2014).  The mid-2016 Stern review of the REF 
commissioned by the UK government recognized the gaming issue and effectively 
recommends that RP scores simply replace REF quality (‘GPA’) scores.  Another of its key 
recommendations is that all academics’ outputs be reported by institutions (Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2016).  Therefore when gauging research 
performance, rather than employing REF scores we prefer to employ RP scores. 
 
RESEARCH PERFORMANCE AND NATIONAL RANKINGS 
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The overall purpose of our study is to examine whether UK universities that managed to 
improve their research performance between 2008-14 as assessed by the REF also 
experienced improvements in their national rankings, or whether the rankings are essentially 
legacy effects and impervious to changes in research performance.  If the latter is the case, 
then it is questionable whether non-leading universities should adopt a resource-intensive 
strategy geared to improving research performance.  In addressing our overall purpose, we 
examine a number of related issues.  How strong are associations between research 
performance and the annual rankings and over time?  Do significant changes to research 
performance result in similar changes to the rankings?  To the extent that this is the case, are 
significant changes to the research performance of non-leading universities sufficient to 
propel them into the ranks of leading universities?  
The questions we pose are particularly relevant to the viability of non-leading 
universities intensifying their REF research efforts in order to enhance their rankings.  If the 
substantial investments required to perform well in REF research have no significant 
consequence for the standing of a university as indicated by rankings then their managers 
should understand that.  The implication would be that non-leading universities might be 
more effective if they directly targeted selected components of organizational effectiveness 
contained in the rankings, such as teaching quality. In some UK universities, the size of the 
task of improving REF research appears considerable.  Especially in the post-92s, research 
was until quite recently a relatively under-emphasized activity and it has in many cases 
remained a secondary one (Harley, 2002).  One of Harley’s (2002: 1997) post-92 informants 
even described it at that point as ‘neglected and regarded with suspicion’.  Internal critics of 
research-informed strategies at these universities often regard teaching as the key institutional 
task and therefore ask whether institutional research investments (frequently presented as 
cross-subsidies to research) are justified (Fulton, 2003).   
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Such questioning occurs in a context of broader skepticism voiced by some UK 
academics about the value and especially the results within academe of state assessments of 
research performance.  In contrast to some other countries where performance-based funding 
systems have been introduced, a long strand of critical assessments of UK research 
performance assessments, and their consequences within universities - especially the 
increasing use of journal rankings lists - now exists (Reborra and Turri, 2013).  This forms 
part of a burgeoning wider literature on growing ‘managerialism’ in UK universities (see 
inter alia Puxty et al.; 1994; Humphrey et al., 1995, and more recently Willmott, 2011; 
Mingers and Willmott, 2013; Tourish and Willmott, 2015; Clarke and Knights, 2015).  These 
criticisms reflect the fundamental ways in which, despite frequent initial skepticism, rankings 
can come to change how ‘attention is redistributed’ and affect the way in which academic 
work, its costs and benefits and even professional identities are understood (Espeland and 
Sauder, 2009: 605).  The critics cited above argue that university managers have taken the 
opportunities offered by the REF to exercise increasing control over academics and their 
work, thereby threatening academic freedom.  Few defenses have been attempted (for an 
exception see Rowlinson et al., 2015).  If our analysis showed that improved research 
performance brought no wider benefits, then their managerial use would appear questionable 
on those pragmatic grounds alone and not only on the principled ones advanced by critics.   
We suggest that while the link between research performance and the various GRG 
organizational effectiveness factors is indirect it is nevertheless likely to be potent as it is part 
of a virtuous circle.  A leading GRG ranking contributes to attracting ‘good’ students in the 
sense that they are highly motivated and have high levels of cultural capital (Reay et al., 
2009).  Universities with ‘good’ students can better attract leading academics who by 
definition are relatively successful researchers (De Fraja et al., 2013).  The agglomeration of 
such academics may be configured by management to improve research performance. 
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However, an alternative model for non-leading universities does exist.  The strategy 
adopted by the post-92 University of Northampton is consistent with Shattock’s arguments 
and offers an alternative approach for non-leading institutions that aligns with their 
vocational tradition.  It sees little point in prioritizing REF performance (University of 
Northampton, 2015).  It argues that alternative or additional funding sources to those offered 
by the state could be accessed by developing links with business and local communities, by 
offering practically-oriented research and consultancy.  Such universities could thereby build 
on existing vocational traditions, and simultaneously enhance teaching and overall 
organizational effectiveness as measured by GRG.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To respond to our overall purpose we initially adopt a two-fold explorative approach.  One 
aspect of Shattock’s thesis suggests that we should expect little change over time in either RP 
or GRG terms.  Thus, our first explorative research goal involves examining the degrees of 
association of research performance in 2008 and in 2014 and between GRG in 2008 and 
2014.  This six-year period is significant because it was in conjunction with the 2008 REF 
that the research assessment exercise acquired added significance as a determinant of 
substantial research funding.  We then investigate the key issue of whether change in RP 
between 2008 and 2014 has any impact on change in GRG. 
A second aspect of Shattock’s thesis is that even if we observed an impact of change 
in RP and GRG rankings, this will not involve non-leading universities breaking into the 
ranks of leading universities since the latter’s resource complementarities are impervious to 
any developments by non-leading universities.  Thus, our second explorative research task 
addresses whether any association between changes in RP and GRG rankings between 2008 
16 
 
and 2014 is associated with changes within the rankings of leading universities as opposed to 
non-leading universities.  
 
OPERATIONALIZATIONS 
Dependent Variable 
As indicated, we employ the GRG rankings as a measure of the organizational effectiveness 
of UK universities.  As well as employing GRG in 2014 we also employ a measure of GRG 
change between 2008 and 2014 calculated as rate of change.  When calculating changes to 
GRG between 2008 and 2014, some universities have only data reported by the newspaper 
for either 2008 or 2014 meaning that change cannot be calculated.  This reduced the 
population of universities available for analysis to exactly 100. 
Research Performance 
In order to operationalize our main independent variable, as we have argued above, we prefer 
to use RP as our measure of research performance between 2008 and 2014.  It measures a 
combination of overall REF quality gradings and the number of faculty submitted.  It is 
arrived at as follows.  All of the REF indicators were measured by expert peer-review panels 
and were graded 0-4 where 0 suggests that the work is below nationally-recognized standard 
and 4 represents world-leading research.  The composite result in any given unit of 
assessment (UoA) is referred to as a ‘Grade Point Average’ (GPA).  A further measure is 
then derived by multiplying the GPA by the full-time equivalent number of researchers 
submitted, giving a RP ranking between universities in a given UoA.  Thus, in a sense RP is a 
measure of the depth of research quality within a given university’s faculty.  
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In our analysis, we employ two variants of RP, in levels and in changes: RP either in 
2008 or in 2014, or Change in RP between 2008 and 2014. 
Control Variables 
In our regression analyses, we control for university size, which we operationalize as Number 
of Students (undergraduate and post-graduate).  Further, we control for Faculty Cost per full-
time academic, total Capital (non-faculty) Expenditure, and Russell Group membership, all as 
reported by individual institutions in their annual reports.  All control variables are measured 
at 2008. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
Correlation Analysis 
As an initial step, we employ a correlation analysis to explore the relationship between GRG 
in 2008 and GRG in 2014 and RP in 2008 and RP in 2014.  We report the results in Table 2.   
- Table 2 here – 
Table 2 indicates that GRG rankings in 2008 and 2014 are highly correlated.  In short, there 
is substantial stability in both GRG and RP over the six-year period.  The table also suggests 
that powerful links exist between GRG rankings and RP.  The correlations between RP rank 
in 2008 and GRG are strong not only for GRG 2008, but are almost unchanged for GRG 
2014.  The implication is that universities with strong research performances are also well-
ranked in the non-research areas of organizational effectiveness that GRG captures.  
However, although the association between RP 2008 and GRG in 2014 (or 2008) is strong, it 
is not perfect.  
Table 2 enables us to explore whether changes in RP between 2008 and 2014 have 
any association with changes in GRG rankings in the same period.  When we correlate the 
rate of change in RP between 2008 and 2014 with the rate of change in GRG for the same 
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period we find a statistically significant positive correlation.  Albeit modest (0.23), the 
correlation implies that the two rates of change exhibit broadly similar trends.  
Regression Analysis  
In Table 3, we move beyond correlation to test a model that addresses the issue of the 
causality between RP in 2008 and GRG in 2014 in a linear regression framework.  The 
purpose of the model is two-fold.  First, it is to examine the degree to which RP in 2008 
sustains its impact on GRG in 2014, and second to assess the impact of change in RP between 
2008 and 2014 on GRG rankings in 2014.  Summary statistics for all the regression variables 
are reported in Appendix 2.  In Table 3, we initially introduce RP 2008 as a determinant of 
GRG 2014.  We thereafter extend the estimated specification step-wise and introduce the 
Change in RP between 2008 and 2014 (model 2), and then the controls - Number of Students, 
Faculty Cost and Capital Expenditure (model 3) and Russell Group membership (model 4).   
- Table 3 here – 
In column 2, the explanatory variables are the RP rank in 2008 and RP change 
between 2008 and 2014.  We find that the RP rank 2008 is an important factor affecting the 
GRG rank 2014 with a marginal effect of 0.76; the marginal effect of the Change in RP rank 
is similarly high at 0.85.  Furthermore, both effects are statistically significant meaning that 
even though initial conditions matter, RP change between 2008 and 2014 does have a distinct 
impact on GRG rank 2014.  The high measure of explained variance of the regressions is 
noteworthy; Adjusted R2 ranges between 0.56 in column 1 and 0.64 in column 2, indicating 
the strong explanatory power of our simple model. 
As a robustness check, we present results from other extended specifications; in 
column 3 besides the main variables of interest we add controls for number of students, 
faculty cost per full time and capital (non-faculty) expenditure.  Number of students, 
measuring organization size, has a negative and statistically significant impact while none of 
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the other control variables achieves statistical significance.  In a further step, in column 4 we 
add to the specification a dummy indicating membership of the Russell group that may 
capture additional unobserved fixed effects.  However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant.  Further analysis (not reported here) indicates that this is because membership of 
the Russell Group is highly correlated with research performance.  Importantly, the 
coefficients of the two main variables in the base specification, column 2 remain stable in the 
extended specifications in columns 3 and 4.  In other words, RP in 2008 and Change in RP 
between 2008 and 2014 are the most important determinants of GRG rank in 2014.  
We now turn to the issue of whether changes in RP result in changes to GRG.  We 
estimate a specification where the dependent variable is Change in GRG between 2008 and 
2014 and the explanatory variables are the same as in the previous table.  The results are 
displayed in Table 4.  
- Table 4 here – 
The main finding is that while RP 2008 does not have a statistically significant impact 
on GRG change, Change in RP ranking does.  The marginal effects of RP change are between 
1.12 and 1.18 across specifications.  The effects of the control variables in columns 3 and 4 
are all insignificant.  When Change in RP is entered, adjusted R2 is 0.26 and, in columns 3 
and 4, 0.28.  While these adjusted R2 measures are substantially lower than their equivalents 
in Table 3, they are of importance.  While the results in Table 3 indicate that both initial 
conditions in terms of research status (RP 2008) and changes to RP over the period of 
analysis play a role in determining GRG ranking in 2014, Table 4 indicates that only change 
in RP is significantly associated with change in GRG.  There is therefore some evidence that 
those universities improving their RP can expect to change their GRG rank.  
In summary, in line with the first facet of Shatttock’s thesis that GRG rankings will be 
largely stable, our correlation analysis suggests considerable stability not only in terms of 
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GRG rankings but also in RP.  However, there is an indication that changes in RP are 
associated with changes in GRG.  The regression analyses add further credibility to this 
association.  The second facet of Shattock’s thesis is however that the association between 
changes in RP and changes in GRG are a feature of non-leading universities.  We now turn to 
this issue.   
Location of Variability  
As an initial step to investigating where among the population of UK universities the impact 
of changes in RP on changes to GRG rank is most evident, and to observe how significant it 
is, we examined the five universities that had had the greatest declines in RP rankings and the 
five universities with the greatest RP improvements for the period 2008-2014.  
Observing the five universities whose RP rankings declined most between 2008 and 
2014 in Table 5, we note that none of these was ranked by GRG 2008 as being in the upper 
quintile of universities.  
- Table 5 here - 
In that sense, none was a leading institution.  The table indicates that all of these universities’ 
GRG rankings also declined.  In the case of the University of Bradford its RP declined by 28 
places between 2008 and 2014 and its GRG rank by 47 places.  We see similar dramatic falls 
for Edinburgh Napier and Cardiff Metropolitan.  While the University of Salford suffered a 
decline in its RP of 19 places this only had a marginal downward impact on its GRG ranking.  
It nevertheless appears that in general falls in RP result in falls in GRG rankings, and that 
these may be sharp.  
When we examine those universities with the greatest improvements to their RP 
ranking in Table 6, we note that none of them had leading GRG rankings in 2008.  Nor did 
they have a leading ranking in 2014.  
- Table 6 here -  
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Northumbria’s RP improved by 30 places between 2008 and 2014 while its GRG ranking 
improved from 87 to 58.  We see similar results for Huddersfield and Edge Hill.  However, 
for Worcester and Bedfordshire, paradoxically, improvements in their RP were accompanied 
by declines in their GRG ranking.  The upside possibilities of RP performance therefore 
appear to be somewhat less predictable than the downside.  However, Tables 5 and 6 involve 
small numbers of universities.  Nevertheless, what they do indicate is that the most dramatic 
changes to RP are a feature of non-leading universities.  
Location of Volatility 
In Table 7 we explore whether the uppermost quintile of universities together with the next 
19 highest ranked universities (i.e. the top 39 institutions) are more or less volatile 
(heterogeneous) than the rest in terms of their RP and GRG performance.  We use a common 
measure of volatility defined as the standard deviation of the rate of change in RP and GRG 
rankings.  The table indicates a much higher degree of stability (and less heterogeneity) 
within the top-quintile as well as the top-39 universities compared to the rest.  We obtain 
similar results when we divide universities according to either their 2008 RP or GRG 
position.  
- Table 7 here – 
In sum, while both correlation and the regression analyses suggest that GRG rankings 
and RP are predominantly stable over time, changes to RP are associated with changes in 
GRG.  Our analysis of the location of variability and volatility indicate that radical change to 
RP occurs outside of the leading (and the lowest-rated) universities and is a feature of 
middle-ranking universities.  While one should exercise extreme caution in extrapolating 
from our data, given current trends it seems a tall order to expect that improvements or 
declines in research performance in themselves will result in substantial changes to the 
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leading GRG rankings.  As Shattock argued, reputations at the top of the distribution and 
those factors that underpin them appear to be very “sticky”.  
Our analysis supports the notion that the UK contains two distinct types of 
universities.  On the one hand, there are leading institutions whose RP and GRG did not 
change to any great degree between 2008 and 2014.  On the other, there are non-leading 
institutions that are significantly more volatile in RP and GRG rankings and indeed, where 
cases of fairly dramatic variability exist.  Our analysis also supports the notion of the 
difficulty non-leading institutions have, regardless of changes to their research performance, 
of breaking into the ranks of the leading institutions.  Thus, both aspects of Shattock’s thesis 
are supported.    
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
Our overall contribution has been to provide empirical support for Shattock’s argument that 
breaking into the group of leading universities in terms of organizational effectiveness through 
improving research performance is unlikely for outsiders.  We demonstrate that it has not 
occurred in recent years.  We supplement his argument by showing that the RP of non-leading 
universities is related to their wider GRG rankings.  Thus, failing to maintain RP has a negative 
impact on their GRG rankings that in some cases appears quite dramatic.  
Our first research question asked whether change in RP ranking mattered to the GRG 
ranking.  We found a statistically significant relation suggesting that improvements in research 
performance positively impact changes to GRG rankings.  Our second research question asked 
whether this matters to leading institutions.  Our location of variability and volatility analysis 
indicates that changes to GRG rankings are confined to non-leading universities.  Overall, this 
means that improving research performance does potentially constitute a viable strategy for 
23 
 
non-leading universities to compete with each other, but also that breaking into the ranks of 
leading institutions is unlikely.   
Hence, the rankings of leading institutions are not obviously threatened by the research 
performance improvements of non-leading institutions.  Shattock’s arguments about the 
apparently insuperable difficulties other universities face in trying to break into the leading 
group therefore attract support from our evidence.  For those concerned with state policy, our 
findings suggest the existence of a firm line between leading universities and non-leading that 
is reproduced over time.  If the reproduction of existing institutional hierarchies is in fact a tacit 
policy goal and the state is content to allow the regulatory capture that Martin and Whitley 
(2010) argue is present, then this may be acceptable to policy makers.  If on the other hand 
state management of the system as a whole requires greater inter-institutional parity of esteem 
in order, for example, to raise the prestige of vocational education, as successive governments 
have suggested over a long period would be positive, then it is an issue.   
Should, then, managers of non-leading universities aiming to increase overall 
organizational effectiveness abandon trying to improve their universities’ REF performance 
and, like the University of Northampton develop a strategy that is independent of any concern 
with the REF?  Given the path dependency of research performance and the resources involved 
in preparing for and participating in the REF, this alternative strategy may be tempting.  
However, there are dangers associated with it.  Universities experiencing marked declines in 
their research performance generally suffered in terms of organizational effectiveness as 
measured by the GRG rankings.  Such falls may not inspire consumer confidence.  Equally, 
although dramatic improvements in research performance do not confer entry to the ranks of 
the leading universities, they do generally enhance GRG rankings and therefore add to the 
prestige of these universities in relation to their more immediate competitor institutions.  This 
may be particularly helpful where institutions cluster closely, as in urban contexts.  However, 
24 
 
it is conceivable that the demands of the REF are such that for some institutions a ‘Northampton 
strategy’ may be the only viable strategic option.  In this case, a three-level overall structure 
may emerge among universities: leading institutions, non-leading and ‘REF opt-outs’.  
Our analysis cannot provide more fine-grained guidance about the precise level of 
emphasis that ought to be put on REF-related research by non-leading institutions.  This is an 
effort-reward calculation.  On the reward side, there may be different values for institutions 
depending on their position in the higher education market, the level of local competition and 
the priorities of the particular segment of consumers that they target.  Among consumers 
targeting non-leading universities, priorities appear to include several factors with no research 
connection such as buildings and facilities (Price et al., 2003).   
Our study has several clear limitations that could be addressed by future research.  One 
is that a six-year period is limited.  Future research will depend on whether future REF 
exercises are comparable.  Another limitation is that, despite its virtues as a multidimensional 
and comparative index, GRG as a measure of the organizational effectiveness of universities 
could be regarded as contentious.  Further, we can only speculate as to whether changes to RP 
affect certain factors in the GRG ranking more than others.  Moreover, the mechanisms through 
which this occurs are likely complex and our research design does not allow us to touch on 
them.  One possibility is that students perceive improvement in research performance directly 
through the teaching they receive and respond positively.  In broad terms, this would be 
consistent with Artès et al.’s (2017) study of a medium-sized Spanish university that improved 
research may contribute to an overall improvement in teaching quality.  A second is that 
students perceive changes to research performance indirectly via enhanced institutional 
reputation (reflected in their expectations of acquiring what they regard as desirable jobs) and 
it may be this rather than the learning experience that shifts.  A third possibility is that 
universities that make an effort at improving their research performance are also engaged in 
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improvements in other areas.  This may include their HRM practices including how they select, 
retain and motivate staff.  Indeed all of these possibilities may apply and require further 
examination.  
A third limitation of our study concerns the generalizability of our findings.  The REF, 
a government led system of ranking of research, is unique to the UK.  However, if universities 
in other countries converge around the ABS journal rankings that underpin the REF or similar 
rankings then within country, and even between-country REF-style assessments may become 
more likely.  Further, as various third party actors now produce rankings of universities across 
many countries, then one can expect researchers in these countries to ask similar research 
questions to ours.   
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TABLES 
Table 1 The weighting of GRG factors  
GRG element Proportion as percentages 
Entry score  15 
Feedback as rated by 
graduates  
10 
Job prospects  15 
Final-year students opinions 
about the overall quality of 
their course  
5 
 
Spending per student  15 
Faculty-student ratio  15 
Teaching quality as rated by 
graduates of the course   
10 
Value added: entry 
qualifications related to final 
degree classification  
15 
Source: Guardian (2013) 
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Table 2 Correlation analysis, RP and GRG (n=100) 
 RP 2008 RP 2014 Change 
RP  
GRG 
2008 
GRG 
2014 
Change 
GRG  
RP 2008 1 0.96 
(0.00) 
0.22 
(0.02) 
0.82 
(0.00) 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.02) 
RP 2014  1 0.04 
(0.61) 
0.81 
(0.00) 
0.80 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
Change RP   1 0.22 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.76) 
0.23 
(0.02) 
GRG 2008    1 0.82 
(0.00) 
0.36 
(0.00) 
GRG 2014     1 -0.07 
(0.48) 
Change GRG  
 
     1 
Note: The pairwise correlation coefficients and their p-values in brackets are reported. 
Change denotes rate of change. The correlation coefficients shown in bold indicate five 
percent level of significance or better. 
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Table 3 Regression analysis: GRG rank in 2014 (n=100) 
 Dependent variable: GRG rank in 2014 
 1 2 3 4 
RP 2008 rank 0.71 (0.06) 0.76 (0.05) 0.82 (0.07) 0.82 (0.08) 
Change RP rank  0.85 (0.21) 1.14 (0.22) 1.13 (0.22) 
Number of students   -1.15 (0.30) -1.14 (0.30) 
Faculty cost   0.06 (0.14) 0.06 (0.15) 
Capital expenditure   0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 
Russell group    1.27 (7.17) 
Adj. R sq. 0.56 0.64 0.69 0.69 
Note: Marginal effects and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. The marginal effects 
shown in bold indicate five percent level of significance or higher. 
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Table 4 Regression analysis: Change in GRG rank between 2008 and 2014 (n=100) 
 Dependent variable: Change in GRG rank between 2008 and 2014 
 1 2 3 4 
RP 2008 rank -0.12 (0.08) -0.04 (0.05) -0.003 (0.07) 0.01 (0.08) 
Change RP rank  1.12 (0.21) 1.16 (0.22) 1.18 (0.22) 
Number of students   -0.13 (0.28) -0.14 (0.28) 
Faculty cost   0.06 (0.15) 0.05 (0.15) 
Capital expenditure   -0.01 (0.03) -0.004 (0.03) 
Russell group    -3.02 (6.55) 
Adj. R sq. 0.04 0.26 0.28 0.28 
Note: Marginal effects and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. The marginal effects 
shown in bold indicate five percent level of significance or higher.  
  
34 
 
Table 5 Universities with the greatest decline in RP rank 2008-2014 
Institution RP rank decline  GRG 2008 rank GRG 2014 rank 
Edinburgh Napier 
University 
17 55 85 
University of Salford 19 84 85 
Cardiff Metropolitan 
University 
20 76 105 
Robert Gordon University 20 40 55 
University of Bradford 28 43 90 
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Table 6 Universities with the greatest improvement in RP rank 2008-2014 
Institution RP rank 
improvement  
GRG 2008 rank GRG 2014 rank 
Northumbria University 30 87 58 
University of Worcester 26 54 95 
University of Huddersfield 25 95 42 
University of Bedfordshire 25 94 110 
Edge Hill University 21 109 70 
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Table 7 Volatility in performance comparisons (n=100) 
Performance measure Top-20 Top-39 Outside Top-39 
RP 0.10 0.12 0.23 
GRG  0.21 0.36 0.68 
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Appendix 1 
Measures used in the Guardian Guide, The Complete University Guide, The Times 
Measures  The Guardian The Complete 
University 
Guide 
The Times 
Student satisfaction  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Research assessment    ✓ ✓ 
Entry standards  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Student/staff ratio  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Spend on academic services  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Spend on student facilities    ✓ ✓ 
Good honours degrees    ✓ ✓ 
Completion rates    ✓ ✓ 
Graduate prospects  ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Value added (qualifications upon 
entry are compared with the degree 
award that a student receives at the 
end of their studies) 
 ✓    
Sources: http://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk; 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rankings_of_universities_in_the_United_Kingdom 
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Appendix 2 
Summary statistics for regression variables (n=100) 
Variable Definition Mean (S.D.) 
GRG 2014 Guardian university ranking 
guide 2014 rank 
56.38 (34.06) 
GRG Change Change in rank, 2008-2014 0.07 (19.69) 
RP 2008 Research Assessment 
Exercise 2008 rank 
57.17 (35.87) 
RP change Change in rank, 2008-2014 0.80 (9.29) 
Number of students Total number of students in 
2007, thousands 
17.71 (7.28) 
Staff cost Total staff expenditure per 
full-time member of 
academic staff, thousands 
104.02 (13.58) 
Capital expenditure Total capital expenditure, 
millions 
76.63 (77.62) 
Russell group Membership in the Russell 
group of universities 
0.23 (0.42) 
 
 
